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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS:
TH] DIVELOPING LAW
He [the convicted felon] has, as a consequence of his crime, not
only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those
which the law in its humanity accords to him. He is for the time
being the slave of the State.'
This quotation illustrates what was once a typical judicial attitude
toward the rights of prisoners. Today the analogy to slavery is being
repudiated. A prisoner's rights are no longer considered exceptional
privileges that the law "in its humanity accords him"; there is, instead, a
growing recognition that "a prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary
citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him
by law." 2 Acceptance of the fact that incarceration, because of inherent ad-
ministrative problems, may necessitate the withdrawal of many rights and
privileges3 does not preclude recognition by the courts of a duty to protect
the prisoner from unlawful and onerous treatment 4 Courts, at least in
1 Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt) 790, 796 (1871).
2 Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944).
3 See Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948) ; Davis v. Superior Court, 175
Cal. App. 2d 8, 20, 345 P.2d 513, 521 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
4 [I]t seems quite obvious that any further restraint in excess of that per-
mitted by the judgment or constitutional guarantees should be subject to
inquiry. An individual, once validly convicted . . . is not to be divested of
all rights and unalterably abandoned and forgotten by the remainder of
society. . . . The State's right to detain a person is entitled to no greater
application than its correlative duty to protect him from unlawful and
onerous treatment ....
People ex reL. Brown v. Johnston, 9 N.Y.2d 482, 485, 174 N.E.2d 725, 726, 215
N.Y.S.2d 44, 45-46 (1961). See Davis v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 2d 8, 345
P.2d 513 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
Crime cannot be punished by deprivation of federal citizenship. See Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). However, this is possible as to state citizenship under
civil death acts. See, e.g., CAL. PaxAL CoDn §§ 2600-01. See generally Comment,
26 So. CAL. L. REV. 425 (1953); Note, 37 VA. L. Rnv. 105 (1951); 34 VA. L. REv.
463 (1948). Civil death statutes have been sustained as valid exercises of legislative
power to prescribe punishment for crimes. E.g., Quick v. Western Ry., 207 Ala. 376,
92 So. 608 (1922). A sentence in a federal prison does not necessarily bring into
operation the state civil death statute. See In the Matter of Anonymous, 12 Misc. 2d
1073, 175 N.Y.S.2d 282 (Surr. Ct. 1958), nodified, 17 Misc. 2d 691, 187 N.Y.S.2d
870 (Surr. Ct. 1959) ; O'Connor v. Cohen, 173 Misc. 419, 17 N.Y.S.2d 758 (Sup. Ct.
1940). The states may also impose reasonable restrictions on prisoners' exercise of
federal rights during their incarceration in a state institution. See In re Ferguson,
55 Cal. 2d 663, 361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864, 879 (1961).
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theory, have accepted the view that constitutional safeguards are intended
to protect the rights of all citizens, including convicts.
The changing view of prisoners' rights brings two basic factors into
conflict, and the effort to resolve this conflict has resulted in vagueness in
the area of law determinative of prisoners' rights, the means of their as-
sertion, and the remedies for their violation. The first factor is an under-
standable reluctance of the courts to interfere with prison management 5-
particularly in the case of federal courts and state prisons.6 All courts
have recognized that prison officials must be given wide discretion to cope
with the peculiar disciplinary problems with which they are inevitably
faced.7 The second is the increasing repudiation by the courts of the idea
that a prisoner is completely without any rights or remedies. The neces-
sity-and difficulty--of reconciling these conflicting factors was well ex-
pressed in United States ex rel. Yaris v. Shaughnessy,8 where the court
said: "It is hard to believe that persons . . . convicted of crime are at
the mercy of the executive department and yet it is unthinkable that the
judiciary should take over the operation of the . . . prisons. There must
be some middle ground between these extremes. The courts have pro-
ceeded very slowly toward defining it." 9 Courts, the decision continued,
"will interfere if the treatment of prisoners amounts to [the] deprivation
of [their] constitutional rights." 10 As examples the court pointed out that
additional punishment may not validly be imposed upon a person convicted
of murder, that prison regulations may not restrict the prisoner's right to
apply for habeas corpus or prevent him from appealing his conviction, and
that courts have at least considered prisoners' allegations of cruel and un-
usual punishment.." However, a study of the cases involving alleged mis-
treatment indicates that the courts have been so influenced by the dogma
of the independence of prison authorities that judicial intervention has been
5 See, e.g., Powell v. Hunter, 172 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1949); Fussa v. Taylor,
168 F. Supp. 302 (M.D. Pa. 1958); Peretz v. Humphrey, 86 F. Supp. 706 (M.D.
Pa. 1949) ; Wright v. Wilkins, 26 Misc. 2d 1090, 210 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1961) ;
Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Banmiller, 194 Pa. Super. 566, 168 A.2d 793 (1961).
6 See, e.g., Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 640 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 862 (1961) ; Oregon ex rel. Sherwood v. Gladden, 240 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1957);
Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955).
I See cases cited notes 5, 6 .rupra. "[O]nly strict obedience to stern prison rules
can possibly hold control over the eight thousand prisoners . . .many of whom are
hardened, desperate, incorrigible criminals. Lax control . . .will inevitably lead
to . . . mutiny . . . so as to endanger the lives of the prison officers and the
maintenance of our prison system." O'Brien v. Olson, 42 Cal. App. 2d 449, 459, 109
P.2d 8, 15 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941). Prison authorities have the power to punish sum-
marily infractions of prison regulations, since maintenance of discipline is an admin-
istrative rather than a judicial function. Thus, punishment by the prison authorities
for violation of prison regulations concerning escape from prison does not bar a sub-
sequent judicial action for the crime of escape on any theory of double jeopardy. See
People v. Garmon, 177 Cal. App. 2d 301, 2 Cal. Rptr. 60 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960);
State v. Williams, 57 Wash. 2d 231, 356 P.2d 99 (1960).
8 112 F. Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
9 Id. at 144.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
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limited to the extreme situation. Some courts have even stated the dogma
in language which suggests that the courts have no jurisdiction over these
matters.' 2 This last position is untenable if it is agreed that prisoners are
guaranteed some rights; the duty to define and enforce the prisoner's rights
and to balance, when necessary, these rights against the alleged demands
of orderly prison administration is implicit in these guarantees. Until quite
recently, this obligation was not met.13 Recent cases,14 however, indicate
a willingness to strike such a balance and to attempt to search for the
"middle ground" referred to in Shaughnessy.
In analyzing the rights of prisoners, the discussion logically breaks
down into three areas: access to the courts, treatment while incarcerated,
and remedies.
I. AccESS TO THE COURTS
Unless the vindication of prisoner's rights is to be left to the discretion
of the prison officials-which is tantamount to denying that such rights
exist-the right on which all other rights for prisoners will turn is that
of access to the courts. This includes both the right to communicate and
those subsidiary rights which render communication effective.
A. The Right to Communicate
The courts have been readiest to interfere with prison administration
when they have been called upon to protect access to the courts them-
selves.15  Most of the cases in this area involve efforts by the prisoner to
challenge, either directly or collaterally, the validity of his conviction.
Nevertheless, these cases are responsible for a weakening of the noninter-
22 In Feyerchak v. Hiatt, 7 F.R.D. 726 (M.D. Pa. 1948), the court, after denying
that it had jurisdiction to grant petitioner the relief--characterized by the court as
mandamus-requested, went on to say: "The problem . . . is moreover one which
involves administrative discretion . . . which as an independent and abstract ques-
tion is not within the jurisdiction of this Court." Id. at 728.
'3 In Eaton v. Bibb, 217 F.2d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
915 (1955), the plaintiff complained, inter alia, that various prison rules and regu-
lations deprived him of his constitutional rights. The court dismissed this issue without
even examining the regulations involved merely by pointing out that federal courts
do not have the power to regulate the ordinary internal management and discipline of
state prisons. Accord, United States ex tel. Wagner v. Ragen, 213 F.2d 294 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 846 (1954); Morris v. Igoe, 209 F.2d 108 (7th Cir.
1953) ; United States ex tel. Morris v. Radio Station WENR, 209 F.2d 105 (7th Cir.
1953).
14 See, e.g., Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961) ; Sewell v. Pegelow,
291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961) ; Bailleaux v. Holmes, 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959),
rev'd sub nomn. Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
862 (1961); Brown v. McGinnis, 10 N.Y.2d 531, 180 N.E.2d 791, 225 N.Y.S.2d 497
(1962).
15 See, e.g., Bailleaux v. Holmes, supra note 14; United States ex rel. Foley v.
Ragen, 52 F. Supp. 265 (N.D. Ill. 1943), rev'd, 143 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1944) ; In re
Robinson, 112 Cal. App. 2d 626, 246 P.2d 982 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952) ; Sweet v. State,
233 Ind. 160, 117 N.E.2d 745 (1954); In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 361 P.2d 417,
12 Cal. Rptr. 753 (dictum), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864 (1961). But see Siegel v.
Ragen, 88 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Ill. 1949), aff'd, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 990 (1950); In re Chessman, 44 Cal. 2d 1, 279 P.2d 24 (1955).
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ference doctrine as a whole, both by establishing the first area in which
courts talked of prisoner rights rather than privileges and by opening the
door to the effective vindication of other prisoner rights as they were
recognized.
In Ex parte Hull,16 a prison official refused to accept and mail the
petitioner's habeas corpus petition. Despite this, the prisoner, with the
aid of his father, was able to transmit to the court a document wherein he
alleged, inter alia, this denial of access. The perennial problem of access
cases-that when the prisoner reaches a court tle allegations as to that
prisoner are moot-apparently was not present here since the warden
argued that this denial was justified by a prison regulation permitting
censorship of such papers. This suggests that if the regulation were valid
the petition might be dismissed as not properly before the court. How-
ever, the Supreme Court stated unequivocally that "the state and its
officers may not abridge or impair petitioner's right to apply to a federal
court for a writ of habeas corpus. Whether a petition for writ of habeas
corpus addressed to a federal court is properly drawn and what allegations
it must contain are questions for that court alone to determine." 17
The Court has also required that a state prisoner, discriminatorily
deprived by prison authorities acting pursuant to prison rules of the oppor-
tunity to make a timely appeal to state courts, be heard or released.' His
continued confinement without the right of appeal generally given prisoners
would be a violation of the fourteenth amendment. Although due process
may not require the state to provide criminal appeals, 19 when the state does
so provide, arbitrary interference by prison authorities amounts to a denial
of equal protection of the laws. °  Moreover, at least one state court has
indicated that even reasonable institutional regulations may not be applied
in such a manner as to limit the period in which the prisoner has the right
to appeal.
2 1
The guarantee of reasonable access can have no meaning unless the
courts are willing to scrutinize the facts of each case to assure that this
right has not been denied. Unless this is done, sentences might be
indefinite, erroneous convictions never corrected, inhumane treatment
never remedied. The existence of the writ of habeas corpus obviously
requires a right of access. The question becomes: What rules may prison
16312 U.S. 546 (1941).
17 Id. at 549.
I8 Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951) ; see Sweet v. State,
233 Ind. 160, 117 N.E.2d 745 (1954).
19 See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
20 Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951) ; Cochran v. Kansas,
316 U.S. 255 (1942) ; Sweet v. State, 233 Ind. 160, 117 N.E.2d 745 (1954) ; Ortega v.
Ragen, 216 F.2d 561, 563 (7th Cir. 1954) (dictum), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955);
cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
2 People v. Howard, 166 Cal. App. 2d 638, 642, 334 P.2d 105, 108 (Dist. Ct
App. 1958).
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authorities promulgate without constitutionally infringing this right? 22
Only in extreme cases can this question be easily answered. For example,
it would be unreasonable on its face and contrary to the spirit of Ex parte
Hull to deny prisoners access to the courts unless they have managed to
procure counselPs
In the majority of cases the question will be closer and the guar-
antee of access must meet and overcome the noninterference doctrine which
has had differing impacts upon judicial consideration of alleged direct
denials of this right.24 Thus, when a petitioner alleged that he was denied
the right to transmit a petition for habeas corpus because he failed to en-
close the requisite number of copies of the petition, a Pennsylvania court
denied relief since the action complained of was a matter of "internal
management" with which it would not interfere.25 In contrast, a Maryland
court, in dictum relying on Ex parte Hull, declared that a petitioner has
an absolute right to petition for habeas corpus and that it would be im-
proper for the superintendent to refuse to forward a petition or to restrict
its size or contents.2 6 Yet, despite differing degrees of amenability to pris-
oner petitions, in general the courts have shown an illiberal attitude in
defining the right of access. For example, in Spires v. Dowd,27 the court
held that the warden could not prevent the petitioner from mailing to the
clerk of the proper state court any legal document addressed to that court.
However, the court qualified its decision by pointing out that this right did
not extend to the transmission of any materials directly to any judge,28 a
privilege not constitutionally required. Moreover, although a petitioner
may establish a denial of access to the courts, he may be denied relief be-
22 See Bailleaux v. Holmes, 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959), rev'd sub noin.
Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961).
2 3 White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 762 n.1 (1945); see United States ex rel.
Foley v. Ragen, 52 F. Supp. 265 (N.D. Ill. 1943), rev'd, 143 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1944).
The prisoner's decision to represent himself entitles him to no additional consideration
in determining whether he has been accorded reasonable access.
24 See Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 641 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
862 (1961) ; Oregon ea rel. Sherwood v. Gladden, 240 F.2d 910, 912 (9th Cir. 1957) ;
People v. Chessman, 38 Cal. 2d 166, 238 P.2d 1001 (1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 915
(1952). For example, he has no right to be present in court to argue his own appeal,
Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 284-85 (1948) ; Haines v. Castle, 226 F.2d 591, 594
(7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1014 (1956); People v. Chessman, 35 Cal. 2d
455, 467, 218 P.2d 769, 776, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 840 (1950),. although the federal
courts have the power to issue an order in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus to
permit this. Price v. Johnston, supra; Haines v. Castle, mipra. In exercising their
discretion whether or not to issue this order, the courts are to consider the best
interests of both the prisoner and the Government. Theoretically, this is an oppor-
tunity for the court to ease the enormous burden that a prisoner must meet--especially
a petitioner unrepresented by counsel-before judicial relief is possible.
2 5 Commonwealth ex rel. Sharp v. Day, 89 Pa. D. & C. 605 (C. P. 1954) ; see
Edmondson v. Warden, 194 Md. 707, 69 A.2d 919 (1949). The requirement in Sharp
may well have been reasonable. The copies the prisoner was required to furnish were
to go to various state offices: district attorney, attorney general, and possibly the
parole board.
2 6 Warfield v. Raymond, 195 Md. 711, 713, 71 A.2d 870, 871 (1950).
27 271 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1959).
28Id. at 661.
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cause he chose an improper remedy or forum.29 Insofar as the gravamen
of the petitioner's complaint is his difficulty in communicating with the
court, such decisions, whatever their procedural justifications, reveal a
particularly harsh attitude. Although they are not constitutionally re-
quired to do so, unless the courts are ready to overlook or correct such
errors and guide the plea into proper channels, the prisoner must again
begin his endeavors, difficult and perhaps doomed to failure, to reach the
ear of the only authorities who can assure relief.30 These considerations
are relevant whenever a prisoner is denied relief for what may be only
pleading defects. In Siegal v. Ragen,31 the court held that even an allega-
tion that the warden destroyed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was
insufficient to state a cause of action since the petitioner failed to set forth
that it was his own petition and there was no constitutional right to pre-
pare petitions of habeas corpus for other prisoners.32  To justify further
its denial of relief the court neatly hoisted the petitioner by his own petard,
saying:
[T]he fact that he was able to bring this action makes it highly
improbable that he was prevented from filing his petition ....
It is true, that in the past, certain prisoners were prevented from
filing such petitions, but that situation has been remedied. At
present, there are hundreds of petitions pending before the Court
of this district. Consequently, there is ample grounds for this
Court to take judicial notice that, as a general rule of practice,
complete freedom to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus is
granted to the inmates of the State penitentiaries.
33
Thus, this court was willing to take judicial notice that the allegations of
petitioner were not true despite the fact that in the past prisoners had been
denied -the right to petition for habeas corpus. Clearly the fact that pris-
29 E.g., Oregon ex tel. Sherwood v. Gladden, 240 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1957);
United States ex tel. Atterbury v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 964 (1957) ; United States ex tel. Foley v. Ragen, 143 F.2d 774 (7th Cir.
1944) ; Edmondson v. Warden, 194 Md. 707, 69 A.2d 919 (1949).
30 See text accompanying note 39 infra.
3188 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Ill. 1949), aff'd, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 990 (1950). Compare Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955), discussed in text accompanying note 42 infra.
32 88 F. Supp. at 1000.
n Id. (Emphasis added.) Cf. United States ex tel. Foley v. Ragen, 143 F.2d
774 (7th Cir. 1944) (since prisoner was able to reach the federal district court there
was no longer any bar to access and he should seek relief in the state courts). Com-
pare Mar Gong v. Brownell, 209 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1954), involving a proceeding to
establish United States citizenship. The district court judge had reasoned that,
because of the discrepancies he had frequently found in the testimony of similar Chinese
admission cases, the testimony of the case before him was probably without merit.
Mar Gong v. McGranery, 109 F. Supp. 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). The inference thus
raised against the plaintiff's credibility was rejected by the court of appeals: "It must
be realized that this particular plaintiff may in fact be the lawful issue of a citizen
father. However much fabrication or falsification the court may have found in its
experience in the trial of other similar cases, we think it would be unjust to put what
happened in those cases in the scale against this appellant." 209 F.2d at 453.
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oners' petitions are now reaching the court cannot, in the face of a history
of obstruction, relieve the court of its obligation to examine the merits of
each petition with care 34 to make sure that any obstacles which may have
been placed in the prisoner's path shall not be permitted in the future.
Any doctrine of "judicial notice" in this area may help to render academic
the prisoner's right to access to the courts.
The problem of mootness, discussed in connection with Ex Parte Hull
and suggested by Siegel, presents the most serious conceptual barrier to a
prisoner alleging denial of access. In People v. Superior Court 35 the
California Superior Court ordered that the petitioner be permitted to have
immediate access by mail to the courts, to do all research necessary for
the maintenance of his civil rights, to retain personal legal papers, and to
consult privately with his counsel. The court's theory was that a denial
of any one of these rights would constitute a denial of the right of access.
The Supreme Court of California reversed on the ground that at the time
of the hearing and -the making of the order it did not appear that petitioner
was presently being deprived of any rights.30 This argument, of course,
could always be used to preclude any examination of an alleged denial of
access. Thus the prisoner would find himself faced with the dilemma that
if he fails to reach the courts he is obviously without hope of relief, while
if he does he will be told that there is no longer a problem to be remedied.
3 7
Justice Carter in dissent recognized the danger of accepting mootness as
decisive in -these cases and criticized the majority for its failure to realize
that the prison authorities might again withhold these rights from the
prisoner unless they were ordered otherwise.38 Without attempting to
choose between the majority and the dissent on the merits it may be noted
that Justice Carter made clear the considerations vital to the question's
resolution. If there is a real danger that the petitioner will be denied his
rights in the immediate future it should be of little significance that they
are not presently being denied.
34 Compare the language in Haines v. Castle, 226 F.2d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 1955),
cert. deaied, 350 U.S. 1014 (1956) ("Undoubtedly, the repeated and persistent effort
of certain inmates to have certain courts consider the validity of their detention in
prison is annoying to prison officials and, in most cases is entirely unwarranted.
However, the denial of the right to verify legal documents might, conceivably, in
certain instances, be tantamount to a denial to a prisoner of the right to present his
case to a court'), with Edmondson v. Warden, 194 Md. 707, 69 A.2d 919 (1949),
in which the court in denying a writ of habeas corpus admitted that it was motivated
by the number of times that the petitioner had previously applied to the courts.
35 273 P.2d 936 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954).
36In re Chessman, 44 Cal. 2d 1, 279 P.2d 24 (1955).
37 A slight variation of this problem involves the doctrine of exhaustion of reme-
dies in habeas corpus proceedings. In United States ex rel. Foley v .Ragen, 143 F.2d
774, 778 (7th Cir. 1944), the court of appeals reversed a district court, which had
granted relief, on the theory that now that the ban on access to the courts was lifted
the state courts were as accessible as the federal and therefore the petitioner should
first have pursued his remedy there. Compare United States ex rel. Bongiorno v.
Ragen, 54 F. Supp. 973 (N.D. IIl. 1944), aff'd, 146 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 325 U.S. 865 (1945).
38 44 Cal. 2d at 10, 279 P.2d at 30 (dissenting opinion).
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Judicial protection of the rights of a prisoner would indeed be a
mockery if the courts would always accept the pious protestations
of the prison authorities that the rights would be accorded and
then blithely disregard them the next day, leaving the prisoner
to commence again his weary journey through the court process
toward a chimerical goal.
3 9
Once the mootness problem is overcome the court must decide how
effective relief can be given and, insofar as the denial of access is the
result of a general prison regulation, whether the relief is to be extended
beyond the particular petitioners to all prisoners similarly situated. The
techniques and the difficulties of relief are the same for both questions.
The court can enjoin the objectionable conduct or regulation and hope that
its admonition will prevent future interference although obviously the
court may never learn if it is continued. In the final analysis, reliance
may have to be placed on the efforts of third parties-district attorneys
notified of the situation by the judge, various civil libertarian organizations,
and the friends and relatives of prisoners.
B. The Right to Prepare
Closely related to the right to communicate with the courts is the right
to have access to the materials needed to make this communication effective,
although the courts have not shown the concern with its infringement that
they have with respect to what may be termed direct denials of access. Al-
though the free use of legal materials may lead some prisoners to the dis-
covery that their substantive rights are being violated, and hence may be
said to have a secondary substantive aspect itself, the right to prepare,
like the right to communicate with the courts, is important primarily as an
aid in remedying violation of other substantive rights.
Recognition that the prisoners' right to access to the courts is guaran-
teed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments has not been sufficient in
itself to make this right effectively available. Although blatant interference
is usually remedied by the courts, they have been particularly hesitant to
interfere with more subtle methods of denying this right. Prior to the
recent case of Bailleaux v. Holmes,40 the courts had never given serious
consideration to the possibility that a denial of legal materials might
preclude the meaningful exercise of this right.41 Thus, in Ortega v.
89 Id. at 12, 279 P.2d at 31.
40 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959), rev'd sub nora. Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290
F.2d 632 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961).41 The view that a denial of legal materials and legal notes could constitute a
denial of the right of access to the courts was accepted in one of the Chessman cases,
People v. Superior Court, 273 P.2d 936 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954), but the decision
was reversed by the California Supreme Court in In re Chessman, 44 Cal. 2d 1, 279
P.2d 24 (1955). The supreme court reasoned, inter alia, that Chessman was claim-
ing "privileges," which prison authorities could properly deny, rather than rights.
Id. at 10, 279 P.2d at 29. Accord, Grove v. Smyth, 169 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Va.
1958); Piccoli v. Board of Trustees, 87 F. Supp. 672 (D.N.H. 1949).
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Ragen,42 the petitioner alleged that the warden refused to deliver a regis-
tered letter addressed to him containing material necessary for a pending
court action, thereby preventing him from seeking relief from his unlawful
confinement. Despite these allegations, the court held that petitioner failed
to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted. Starting with
the premise that the mere withholding of a letter is an administrative
matter not in itself violative of any federal rights, the court concluded that
the petitioner's failure to allege the letter's contents made it impossible to
determine if the refusal to deliver it actually interfered with any of his
rights. This decision might be read as implying at least some right to legal
materials. However, it reveals the same harsh attitude toward pleading
defects shown by the courts with regard to alleged direct denials of the
right to access, 43 and the objections raised in that connection are equally
relevant here.
In Oregon ex rel. Sherwood v. Gladden,4 even the implication that
there might be a right to legal materials is absent. There the prisoner
attempted to have the court determine the reasonableness of rules that,
among other things, prohibited the petitioner from procuring such materials
and information from other prisoners and from obtaining books from the
Oregon State Library. The court refused to examine the validity of the
regulations on the ground that it had no jurisdiction either to issue a writ
of mandamus except in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,45 or, as a federal
court, to supervise the administration of state penitentiaries.46  Even if
the decision is read as only denying the remedy and not the right, it is
unacceptable. It seems that there should be a right-and of necessity a
remedy-to engage in legal research which is intimately connected with a
prisoner's access to the courts-especially when the prisoner is unable to
procure counsel.4 7 There appears to be no justification for limiting the
constitutional right of prisoner access to the courts to the presentation of
facts rather than legal propositions. If the transmission of legal arguments
is included, how can the right be meaningful unless the courts assure
prisoners reasonable access to law books and legal materials? Although
neither the states nor the federal government may be obligated to provide
law libraries for their inmates or to permit them to convert their cells into
libraries, some opportunity of access to such materials should be deemed
an integral part of access to the courts. Unless such a right exists, the
42216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. dezied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955).
43 See text accompanying note 30 supra.
44 240 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1957).
45 Id. at 911.
4aIbid. The court did indicate, however, that if instead the petitioner applied
for a writ of habeas corpus, the district court might consider whether the conduct of
the authorities was such as to make petitioner's resort to state remedies impossible,
thus permitting a federal court to assume jurisdiction. Ibid.
47 See Bailleaux v. Holmes, 177 F. Supp; 361 (D. Ore. 1959), rev'd sub nain.
Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961);
In re Chessman, 44 Cal. 2d 1, 13-15, 279 P.2d 24, 31 (1955) (dissenting opinion).
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prisoner may be unable to discover that other rights have been infringed.
Even if he does know this, he may, without the aid of legal materials, be
unable to present his complaint effectively even though he is able to reach
the courts. To make clear the existence of these rights, the courts might
adopt as general propositions that where such materials are available within
the prison, access to them must be nondiscriminatory, that prisoners must
be permitted to obtain these materials for themselves, and that any limita-
tion on the exercise of these rights must be justified by the prison
authorities.
There are indications that the noninterference doctrine is breaking
down--or at least being questioned-in this area. The first step in this
direction has been the requirement on the part of a few courts that rules
which may interfere with the prisoner's exercise of his constitutional rights
must be reasonable. Bailleaux v. Holmes 4 8 is an example of an attempt
to apply this new view. Several inmates of the Oregon state penitentiary
brought an action under the Civil Rights Act 49 seeking to enjoin the en-
forcement of certain prison regulations that allegedly interfered with their
right to have effective access to the courts. The regulations in question
limited the time and places in which legal work could be done and restricted
the acquisition and retention of law books and other legal materials. Each
of the petitioners alleged that he had to do his own legal work because he
could not afford to engage an attorney. The petitioners successfully con-
tended in the district court 50 that the totality of these regulations had the
effect of denying them the reasonable access to the courts guaranteed to
them by the fourteenth amendment. The court enjoined the prison au-
thorities from prohibiting petitioners, if not in isolation, from using their
free cell-time for the purpose of studying law and preparing legal docu-
ments or, if in isolation, from communicating with counsel and having
reasonable opportunity to prepare their legal work-taking due regard of
the purpose of isolation; from preventing the purchase of legal materials;
and from confiscating legal documents for violation of prison regulations.
The district court appreciated the "fact that prison authorities must main-
tain effective discipline . . . . However, this end could not be achieved
by stifling the study of law, where such study is necessary to the effective
utilization of a basic right." 51 The court of appeals, while accepting the
principle that the fourteenth amendment guaranteed reasonable access to
the courts, reexamined the merits of the case and found it "self evident"
that the petitioners did have reasonable access. 52 As to the general prison
population, the court concluded that the regulations were for the purpose
48 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959), re7/d sub norn. Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290
F.2d 632 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961).
49 RFV. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958).50 Bailleaux v. Holmes, 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959), 58 MicH. L. REv. 1233
(1960), 39 TEXAS L. Rav. 228 (1960).
51 177 F.2d at 361.
52 Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 640 (9th Cir. 1961).
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of discouraging "cell-house lawyers" and not to hamper inmates in gaining
reasonable access to the courts. As for the prisoners in isolation, the court
concluded that the period of isolation was of a short duration so that it was
reasonable to deny prisoners their right to communicate with their attor-
neys or to have any access to legal papers. The appellate opinion is open
to criticism for its willingness to justify a restriction of access to legal
materials on which prisoner rights depend by a fear of "cell-block" lawyers;
general deprivation of all prisoners should not be based on the danger that
certain of their number might become a nuisance. And the danger of an
increase in the number of groundless legal complaints is primarily a concern
of the courts, which would be the real victims of the increase and are the
proper bodies to determine the legal sufficiency of complaints. 53 Moreover,
although it is not unlikely that many particular regulations could be sus-
tained as reasonable restrictions on the rights of prisoners, it seems clear
that prisoner access to the courts becomes meaningful only when access to
legal materials is protected and that this protection, in turn, takes on
substance only when the courts are willing to look into the specifics of the
situation, as did the district court in Bailleaux, which refused to dismiss
the petition on the basis of vague generalities.54
II. TREATMENT DURING INCARCERATION
Although access to the courts is important in that it permits prisoners
to appeal or attack collaterally their original convictions, it has taken on
additional significance by allowing prisoners to seek redress for improper
treatment during imprisonment. This is true not only in the direct sense
that it has permitted prisoners to raise questions of mistreatment before the
courts but also in that the reexamination of the noninterference doctrine in
the area of access to courts has carried over to a degree into the considera-
tions of treatment during incarceration. Nevertheless, the area remains
shadowy because of the comparative paucity of cases, and delineation is
severely hindered by the continuing influence of the noninterference
doctrine.
In examining the rights of prisoners to be free from unlawful and
inhumane treatment, two questions must be answered with respect to each
possible "right." First, can the prisoner claim a right to be treated in a
specific way, or only a privilege? And second, even if the treatment is only
53 See text accompanying note 17 supra.
54 Another way in which a prisoner may be indirectly denied reasonable access
to the courts is by interference with his efforts to consult privately with counsel.
Although this right has been recognized by the courts only with respect to prisoners
held pending trial, see In re Rider, 50 Cal. App. 797, 195 Pac. 965 (Dist. Ct. App.
1920), a prisoner who is trying to appeal his conviction or is alleging a denial of
some constitutionally protected right seems to have the same need for such private
consultation, see Kahn v. La Vallee, 12 App. Div. 2d 832, 209 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1961)
(dictum). On the other hand, reasonable interference in this area might be necessary
either to prevent possible violence or to make disciplinary measures such as isolation
effective.
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a privilege, does the prisoner still have a right to enjoy it in a nondis-
criminatory manner?
A. Censorship and Use of the Mails
There is no doubt that prison authorities have the right to examine
and, to some extent, censor all mail that is not addressed to the courts. 5
For the most part, courts have avoided consideration of any alleged arbi-
trary interference with prisoners' rights in this area simply by stating in
unqualified terms that there is no constitutionally protected right for pris-
oners to use the mails.56 Some cases, however, seem to suggest that an
absolute ban on all communication would be constitutionally unreasonable.
57
And it seems clear that even if a denial of the use of the mails is not a
constitutional problem itself, it becomes one where the rule is applied in an
arbitrary or discriminatory manner.58 Accordingly, there is at least a
minimum obligation on the courts to determine if the regulation in question
is improperly being applied to the detriment of a particular prisoner or
class of prisoners.
The courts have not yet been presented with the challenge of meeting
this obligation. Restrictions imposed by prison authorities on prisoners'
use of the mails have generally appeared to be reasonable. For example,
it does not appear constitutionally arbitrary for authorities to prevent pris-
oners from writing letters "romantic in nature," 59 to refuse to permit
prisoners to draw up patents and send them to the federal government 60
or to continue correspondence courses, 61 or to prevent correspondence with
the daughter of the superintendent of another institution on the ground
that the prisoner had delusions regarding the girl.62 However, there is a
danger in an unquestioning acceptance by the courts of these apparently
valid administrative measures in the name of noninterference. A pattern
of review has developed wherein the courts have refused to probe beneath
the surface of these regulations to the manner and effect of their application.
55 E.g., Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S.
940 (1955); Adams v. Ellis, 197 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1952); United States ex reL.
Vraniak v. Randolph, 161 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Ill.), aff'd, 261 F.2d 234 (7th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 949 (1959); Green v. Maine, 113 F. Supp. 253 (D. Me.
1953), modified sub nor. Green v. Robbins, 120 F. Supp. 61 (D. Me. 1954), aff'd,
218 F.2d 192 (1st Cir. 1954). As to censorship of mail addressed to the courts, see
notes 15-21 supra and accompanying text.
66E.g., Ortega v. Ragen, supra note 55, at 562; United States ex rel. Vraniak v.
Randolph, supra note 55, at 560; Green v. Maine, supra note 55, at 256.
57 See Dayton v. McGranery, 201 F.2d 711, 712-13 (D.C. Cir. 1953) ; cf. Davis
v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 2d 8, 345 P.2d 513 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
5 8 In Dayton v. McGranery, supra note 57, the court recognized that mail rights
may not be arbitrarily denied but decided, without really examining the merits of the
complaint, that there was no arbitrary denial.
59 Dayton v. Hunter, 176 F.2d 108 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 888 (1949);
see Fussa v. Taylor, 168 F. Supp. 302 (M.D. Pa. 1958).
60 United States ex reL. Wagner v. Ragen, 213 F.2d 294 (7th Cir.) (alternate
holding), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 846 (1954).
61 Numer v. Miller, 165 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1948).
62 Dayton v. McGranery, 201 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
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Nurner v. Miller 63 provides an example of the limitations which may
be placed on a prisoner's use of the mails. The petitioner alleged that he
had been denied access to educational facilities afforded all other inmates
in that the prison authorities refused to permit him to continue a cor-
respondence course in which he had originally been given permission to
enroll. The refusal came after petitioner explained that his purpose for
taking the course was that upon his release he intended to write an expos6
of the prison authorities, whom he described as "a sadistic group in charge
of the brutality department." 6 The court of appeals denied that the case
might be cognizable by the district court, pointing out that Congress en-
trusted the discipline of federal penitentiaries to the Bureau of Prisons.65
The court then disposed of the possibility of any constitutional infringe-
ment of the prisoner's rights: "[A]s to the asserted violation of constitu-
tional guaranties we may add that a prisoner who persists in abusing a
privilege . . . is in no position to complain of unequal treatment if that
privilege is taken away from him." (6 By speaking in terms of "privilege"
the court obscured the fact that a prisoner has the right to be treated like
other prisoners similarly situated. Recognition of this fact would seem
at least to require the court to decide the question of whether or not it was
constitutionally permissible for a prisoner to be denied rights granted
others merely because of his intention to write, upon release, a book
criticizing the prison authorities.
Again, although there exists no absolute right to use the mails, it
would seem that a total bar applied to all prisoners would be constitu-
tionally unjustifiable. It is unlikely, of course, that any such blanket restric-
tion would be attempted and so the question before the courts will go to
the permissibility of restrictions directed at individual prisoners, or limita-
tions on access directed to the prison population as a whole. In these
situations an examination of the nature of the restriction and its proferred
justification must be made if there is to be any judicial definition of the
extent of the right. Such an examination and resolution is not likely to
be made in view of the pattern of summary disposal of such allegations.
B. Discrimination Because of Race or Religion
1. The Nondiscriminatory Practice of Religion
Although no court has apparently ever questioned the right of a pris-
oner to his religious beliefs, restrictions upon the practice of that faith have
63165 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1948).
04 Ibid. Clearly if this was a letter to the courts such language would not justify
censoring the letter, or preventing its transmission. See In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d
663, 675-76, 361 P.Zd 417, 424-25, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753, 760-61, cert. denied, 368 U.S.
864 (1961).
65 Numer v. Miller, 165 F.2d 986, 986-87 (9th Cir. 1948).
66 Id. at 987. (Emphasis added.)
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been judicially accepted. Here again the cases have generally involved the
issue of discriminatory restrictions upon the enjoyment of religious freedom
rather than any complete interdiction. This is an area in which the dogma
of noninterference appears to be waning. Increasingly courts-perhaps
sensitive because of the "preferred" position of these rights 67 --have proved
unwilling to permit denials of freedom of religion even when placed on the
ground of administrative control of prison discipline which has generally
been held to justify denial of "lesser" rights.
The clearest indication of this attitude is found in McBride v. Mc-
Corkle,65 in which the court clearly recognized that prisoners retained an
affirmative right of freedom of religious practice-although it was held
that this right could not be absolute for prisoners any more than it could
be for free men. In this case, inmates who were in segregation alleged a
denial of the free exercise of their religion in the authorities' refusal to
permit them to attend Mass on Sundays and holy days as prescribed by the
Roman Catholic Church. Although the inmates in segregation were not
permitted to accompany the general prison population to the chapel, chap-
lais of each religious faith were permitted to visit the prisoners in their
cells for religious guidance. The Catholic chaplain, however, refused to
say Mass in the segregation wing which had no chapel. Starting from the
basic proposition that religious freedoms could be denied only if the court
found that the restrictions were reasonably necessary to protect some
paramount societal interest,69 the New Jersey court closely examined the
merits of the petitioners' complaint. The court pointed out that this treat-
ment of the petitioners was a function of their position within the prison
rather than of their faith and, therefore, was not discriminatory. Further-
more, the petitioners were given the opportunity to receive the sacraments
through visits of Catholic chaplains. The court therefore concluded that
it was permissible for the prison authorities to decide that it would impair
the disciplinary effect of continuous segregation if the petitioners were per-
mitted to attend Mass with the general prison population. Accordingly,
the regulations in question were held to involve no unwarranted restriction
upon the prisoners' freedom of religion.
70
Kelly v. Dowd 71 illustrates, on the other hand, the courts' traditional
reluctance to interfere even in this area. There, the court of appeals
affirmed the dismissal of a petition for an injunction which would have
ordered the warden to grant the petitioner the right to receive bible-study
help from an established religion. But, although the opinion did not show
the careful consideration of prisoners' rights to religious freedom which
67 See, e.g., Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233, 235 (2d Cir. 1961).
6844 N.J. Super. 468, 130 A.2d 881 (App. Div. 1957).
69 Id. at 479, 130 A.2d at 886-87.
70 Id. at 480, 130 A.2d at 887. It is perhaps ironic that at the time of suit the
prison authorities were building a chapel in the segregation wing. Ibid.
7. 140 F.2d 81 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 783 (1944).
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may be seen in the McBride opinion, this difference may be justified both
by the fact that in Kelly a federal court was being asked to examine the
conduct of state officials without any attempt to raise the question in the
state courts 7 2 and by the failure of the petitioner to allege that he had ever
requested permission to receive the literature in question.
73
Perhaps the major catalyst in the recent shift in judicial attitude has
been the new religious group commonly known as the "Black Muslims."
Thus, the New York Court of Appeals, in Brown v. McGinnis7 4 in the
course of holding that the petitioner could compel the prison authorities
to permit him free exercise of his religion, subject to reasonable rules and
regulations, spoke in strong language concerning the right of prisoners to
the freedom of religion 75 and stressed the fact that restrictions on the
practice of religion must be based upon a showing of danger and not mere
speculation.
7 6
A different attitude may be seen in In re Ferguson,77 which involved
an examination by the California Supreme Court of restrictions placed
upon the religious activities of this group. Muslim literature, characterized
by the correctional officer as "trash," 78 had been confiscated, and the
Muslims were admittedly not granted the same rights as recognized
religious groups. Specifically, the petitioners alleged that they were not
allowed a place to worship, that their religious meetings were broken up,
that they were not allowed to possess an adequate amount of their religious
literature, and that their religious leaders were not allowed to visit them
in prison. The warden admitted the discriminatory treatment, but argued
that it was justified since the petitioners' principles interfered with orderly
prison management. This argument persuaded the court that "even con-
ceding the Muslims to be a religious group it can not be said under the
circumstances here presented that the Director of Corrections has made an
unreasonable determination in refusing to allow petitioners the opportunity
to pursue their claimed religious activities while in prison." 79 Despite
its arguendo aside, the court seemed to have been influenced by the belief
that the "Black Muslims" were not a religious group-the Director of Cor-
rections, had, in fact, denied them this classification 8 0 -entitled to any of
the protections enjoyed by such groups. This belief seems to have been
used to justify the unhesitating denial of a requested order for the return
72 Id. at 83.
73 Id. at 82-83.
74 10 N.Y.2d 531, 180 N.E.2d 791, 225 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1962).
75 Id. at 534-36, 180 N.E.2d at 792-93, 225 N.Y.S.2d at 499-500.
6 Id. at 536, 180 N.E.2d at 793, 225 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
1755 Cal. 2d 663, 361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864
(1961), Comment, 35 So. CAj. L. REv. 162 (1962).
-s Id. at 668, 361 P.2d at 419, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 755.
79 Id. at 672, 361 P.2d at 421, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 757. (Emphasis added.)
80 Id. at 667, 361 P.2d at 418, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 754.
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of a confiscated religious scrapbook which the court considered "as an
ordinary writing advocating or encouraging prohibited conduct" 81 and to
permit the court to refuse to order the prison authorities to allow the
petitioners to purchase their scriptures, a version of the Koran.82  Insofar
as the decision relies on a tacit determination that the Muslims are not a
religion, it conflicts with other recent cases involving this group,m which
have acknowledged that the claim to first amendment protection is sub-
stantial enough to require a hearing. And if, upon hearing, it is recognized
that the Muslims are a religious sect, it becomes incumbent upon the court
to require that the Muslims be accorded the same opportunities as other
faiths to practice their religion to the extent that this is possible without
significantly disturbing prison discipline.84 Thus, the proper disposal of
the petition would have been to permit the petitioners to have obtained
at least all religious materials which were not "inflammatory" in nature.
There appears to be no justification for the court deciding quite broadly
that there can be no right to assemble and discuss any of the Muslim doc-
trines merely because one of the Muslim principles happens to be the in-
evitability of "black supremacy." In the past freedom of religion has
been jealously protected in the face of many conflicting and persuasive
values.8 5 If Black Muslimism is a religion, its exercise demands judicial
protection to the extent consistent with prison discipline. Because it is
new, "odd," and the vehicle of minority aspiration it is imperative that the
courts subject the actions of prison authorities with respect to the Muslims
to the closest possible scrutiny.
McBride, rather than Ferguson, represents the attitude which appears
to be the more widely accepted today. In Sewell v. Pegelow,8 6 the Black
Muslim petitioners alleged that the prison authorities had deprived them,
solely because of their religious beliefs, of certain constitutional and statu-
tory rights going to both the practice of their religion and the enjoyment of
privileges accorded other prisoners. Thus the complaint presented three
81 Id. at 674, 361 P.2d at 423, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 759.
82 Ibid. The Muslim Koran did not appear to be the standard Mohammedan
scriptures. The New York State Director of Corrections recently ordered that
inmates were to be permitted to purchase certain translations of the Koran. Pierce v.
La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233, 236 (2d Cir. 1961).
83 See Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961); Sewell v. Pagelow, 291
F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961).
84 This in fact was the position of the petitioners. See Brief for Appellants, p. 4,
lit re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753, cert. denied, 368 U.S.
864 (1961). It should be recognized that undoubtedly many of the Muslim doctrines
are disturbing to the white prison authorities. The Muslims identify white persons
with "evil" and blame the subjected condition of the Negro to the conspiracy of the
whites who in the past have colonized, enslaved, exploited, despised, lynched, and
disenfranchised the black people. Id. at 8.
85 E.g., West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) ; Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 319 U.S. 296 (1940); see Trescher & O'Neill, Medical Care For
Depe7ndent Children: Manslaughter Liability of the Christian Scientists, 109 U. PA.
L. R1v. 203 (1960) ; Comment, 26 U. Ca. L. REv. 471 (1959).
56291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961).
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questions of constitutional significance: interference with the practice of
religion; discrimination in the practice of religion; and discrimination on
the basis of religion-or if Black Muslimism should, on remand, not be
found to be a religion, on the basis of a possible arbitrary classification.
Nevertheless, the district court, without even holding a hearing or waiting
for an answer, dismissed the complaint on the theory that since the matter
involved the internal discipline of the reformatory it was without juris-
diction to entertain the complaint. The appellate court, however, reversed,
pointing out that this was more than an attack upon disciplinary measures
taken by the prison authorities. Rather the case involved hardships al-
legedly inflicted for no other reason than that these authorities viewed the
appellants' religion unfavorably. The court found the case "manifestly
unlike those in which the courts have declined to interfere because par-
ticular disciplinary measures were taken within the normal management
of the institution." 8 7 Although the court found it unnecessary at that time
to adjudicate the extent of the prisoners' rights, by requiring a hearing on




While some of the cases previously discussed may have involved what
amounted to racial as well as religious discrimination, the petitioners chose
to emphasize the religious issue.89  In Nichols v. McGee9 0 and United
States ex rel. Morris v. Radio Station WENR,91 the federal courts had an
opportunity to deal specifically with the issue of racial discrimination. In
Morris the petitioner alleged that the prison authorities discriminated by
denying Negroes the opportunity to audition or act as announcers for the
radio program that the authorities had established. The court of appeals
87 Id. at 197.
88 See also Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961) ; Brown v. McGinnis,
10 N.Y.2d 531, 180 N.E.2d 791, 225 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1962). The Pierce court rejected
the requirement that a state prisoner must first seek his relief in a state forum,
treating it as a traditional procedural barrier. Significantly, however, the cases dis-
tinguished and disapproved by the court, unlike the case before it, did not involve
suits under the Civil Rights Act. E.g., Oregon ex rel. Sherwood v. Gladden, 240
F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1957) (mandamus); Kelly v. Dowd, 140 F.2d 81 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 321 U.S. 783 (1944) (habeas corpus); Piccoli v. Board of Trustees, 87 F.
Supp. 672 (D.N.H. 1949) (injunction). The exhaustion doctrine has never been an
impediment to suits under the Civil Rights Act, e.g., Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d
632 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961), although in the areas of habeas
corpus and injunctive relief it has been firmly established. Accordingly, despite the
strength of the court's rejection the decision should have no effect on other remedial
devices. However, this fact does not detract from the decision's importance in clearly
illustrating the growing tendency of the courts to overlook the noninterference dogma.
89 See Brief for Petitioners, pp. 1-3, In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 361 P.2d
417, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864, 879 (1961).
90 169 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 6 (1959), 36 DicTA
245.
91209 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1953).
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found it to be "clearly evident" that the complaint was entirely without
merit.9 2 Without even considering the truth of the allegations of dis-
crimination the court justified its decision by reference to twin dogmas:
first, that, in any case, prison discipline is not a function of the federal
courts, and, secondly, that federal courts rarely interfered with state offi-
cials in the performance of their duties.9 3  The court made its position
clear by stating that "a prisoner may not approve of prison rules and
regulations, but under all ordinary circumstances that is no basis for com-
ing into a federal court seeking relief even though he may claim that the
restrictions placed upon his activities are in violation of his constitutional
rights." 94 In light of the petitioner's allegations that it was impossible to
obtain relief in the state courts, this language can only mean that this
petitioner's constitutional rights could not be protected; the court did not
explain what would be the extraordinary circumstances which would
justify relief. This view, clearly not in harmony with the more recent
decisions dealing with alleged denials of religious freedom,9 5 was reiterated
in Nichols v. McGee.9 6 There an inmate of the California State Prison
sought to convene a three-judge court to examine his allegation of racial
discrimination. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that he was kept in an
exclusively Negro cell and was required to eat in a walled-off Negro com-
partment in the dining hall. In addition, there was an allegation that the
Negro dining facilities were unequal since they were located furthest from
the available exit and would be dangerous in the event of fire or disorder.
9 7
The theory of the petitioner was that such racial segregation caused a loss
of self-respect and was prohibited by Brown v. Board of Educ.98 The
court found three reasons why the petitioner's complaint should not be
heard. First, inasmuch as petitioner sought to question the constitution-
ality of a departmental regulation or policy rather than a statute, the
issue could not properly be brought before a three-judge court.9 9 The
court also concluded that a fatal defect in the complaint was the failure to
show that his rights could not be preserved by a proper proceeding in the
state courts. Finally, the court concluded that "even if recourse had first
been had to the courts of California, plaintiff's proposed complaint could
state no cause of action in this Court." 10 This last reason is the most
92 Id. at 107. The petitioner had been careful to allege that he had been unable
to obtain a hearing in any state court.
93 Ibid.
94 Id. (Emphasis added.)
95 See notes 67-88 mupra and accompanying text.
96 169 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 6 (1959).
97 Id. at 723.
98 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
99 But cf. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 824-27 (1961).
100 Nichols v. McGee, 169 F. Supp. 721, 724 (N.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed, 361
U.S. 6 (1959).
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significant in terms of potential barriers to recognition of the civil liberties
of prisoners. The court's position was that not all infringements of the
constitutional rights of prisoners would justify judicial intervention but
only interferences so "grave" and "substantial" and reaching "such a con-
stitutional magnitude" as would justify departure from the general rule
of noninterference.' 0 1 However this test may be construed in the future,
this court indicated that "ordinary" discrimination based solely on the
race of the individual does not fall within its proscription. Moreover, the
court's blanket determination that "by no parity of reasoning can the
rationale of Brown v. Board of Education . . . be extended to State penal
institutions" 102 seems unwarranted.
10 3
C. Physical Mistreatment
The eighth amendment specifically prohibits cruel and unusual punish-
ment; 104 and either this prohibition or a similar one is extended to the
states by the due process clause of the fourteenth.10 5 The problem lies in
determining what conduct falls within the constitutional command whose
scope has had only the vaguest delineation provided by a relative handful
of decisions limited to some particular mistreatment. 0 6 A review of these
cases makes clear only the unlikelihood of a petitioner's assertion of mis-
treatment. The problem in this area is not that the right to be free from
inhumane treatment is not recognized but rather the difficulty of sub-
stantiating the complaint. This is due partially to the court's traditional
101 Id. at 725.
102 Id. at 724.
103 Insofar as socio-psychological insights support Bron, they are clearly not
limited to the facts of that case, and the demands of the equal protection clause have
been extended beyond the area of education. See, e.g., Moorhead v. City of Fort
Lauderdale, 152 F. Supp. 131 (S.D. Fla.), aft'd, 248 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1957) (recre-
ational facilities); Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd per curizm,
352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses). Although the danger of violence, for example, might
justify temporary or partial segregation, it seems that even this must be limited to
extreme cases. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
104 See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Banmiller, 194 Pa. Super. 566, 168
A.2d 793 (1961) ; United States ex" rel. Atterbury v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 953, 958 (7th
Cir. 1956) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 964 (1957) ; Sutherland, Due
Process and Cruel Punishment, 64 HARv. L. Rxv. 271 (1950); Note, 1960 WASH.
U.L.Q. 160 n.4.
105 See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) ; id. at 466
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Moreover, many states have constitutional provisions
prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments. E.g., CAL. CoNsT. art I, § 6; N.Y.
CoNsT. art. I, § 5.
106 For example, Congress could not take away citizenship as punishment for
wartime desertions, Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1957) ; a second attempt at execu-
tion was not cruel and unusual punishment, Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,
329 U.S. 459 (1947) ; a statute requiring a vasectomy operation on those twice con-
victed of a felony violated due process, Davis v. Berry, 216 F.2d 413 (S.D. Iowa
1914), rev'd on other grounds, 242 U.S. 468 (1917); keeping prisoners in a prison
described as a "fabulous obscenity" by health officials did not amount to cruel and
unusual punishment, Ex parte Pickens, 101 F. Supp. 285 (D. Alaska 1951).
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reluctance to supervise the administration of prisons.10 7  Another sig-
nificant factor, however, is the enormous evidentiary burden of proving
mistreatment. The existence of prisoner rights provides small solace unless
they can be translated into reality. But there are inherent in the prison
situation difficulties which are likely to prove insurmountable. Cases in-
volving alleged mistreatment are likely to turn, even assuming good faith,
on disputed issues of fact. In the resolution of these disputes not only are
the authorities likely to have control over all the available evidence,108 but
their testimony will probably carry more weight than that of the prisoner.10 9
This problem of discrediting the prisoner's testimony is also present
with respect to the testimony of other prisoners who may be the only
witnesses, even assuming they are willing to risk possible retribution, the
prisoner can obtain. 10 Despite the understandable unwillingness of courts
to waste time on apparently frivolous claims, the difficulties facing a pris-
oner who seeks to prove that he has been subject to unconstitutional treat-
ment suggest that the courts should undertake to ensure that petitioners
have every possible opportunity to substantiate their claims."'
It may be less difficult for a petitioner to show group mistreatment re-
sulting from unjust prison regulations or a general pattern of misbehavior
on the part of prison authorities than to establish that he was singled out
for mistreatment. Thus, in Johnson v. Dye,1 2 in which habeas corpus was
used to challenge extradition, the petitioner, an escapee from a Georgia
107 The noninterference dogma is usually employed in addition to other grounds
which are more particularly related to the remedial technique employed by the prisoner.
See, e.g., Custis v. Jacques, 130 F. Supp. 920 (W.D. Mich. 1954); Commonwealth
ex rel. Smith v. Banmiller, 194 Pa. Super. 566, 168 A.2d 793 (1961). Success for
the prisoner is more promising under Civil Rights Act. See notes 133-39 infra and
accompanying text.
108 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bongiorno v. Ragen, 54 F. Supp. 973, 978
(N.D. Ill. 1944), aff'd, 146 F.2d 349 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 865 (1945),
where the court said:
There is no evidence that the letter [addressed to the court] was or was not
transmitted. The docket of the Supreme Court is silent in respect thereof.
The letter may or may not have been presented to the court and may or may
not have been considered by it While the court is in grave doubt, it does
not feel that it can, on these facts, hold that there was a denial of the equal
protection of the laws.
The court did not attempt to answer the unanswerable: How could the petitioner
possibly meet this burden?
109 See Commonwealth ex rel. Thompson v. Day, 104 Pittsb. 317 (Pa. C.P.),
aff'd, 182 Pa. Super. 644, 128 A.2d 133 (1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 843 (1957).
In Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961), the attorney for the appellants
filed an appendix to their brief containing the names of twenty-two imprisoned Black
Muslims who were willing to testify as to their mistreatment. Appendix to Appel-
lants Brief, pp. 5-6.
110 See Note, 59 YALE L.J. 800, 808 (1950).
" Thus, for example, the courts should give the greatest possible latitude in
their interpretation of petitioner's complaints and appeals. Cf. United States ex rel.
Atterbury v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 953, 957 (7th Cir. 1956) (concurring opinion), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 964 (1957) ; Whiting v. Seyfrit, 203 F.2d 773, 774 (7th Cir. 1953);
Allen v. Corsano, 56 F. Supp. 169, 170 (D. Del. 1944).
112 175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir.), reVzd per curian on other grounds, 338 U.S. 864
(1949).
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chain gang, successfully established that he had been the victim of cruel
and unusual punishment. Proof of mistreatment was made by the testi-
mony of petitioner and other escapees, and by articles from magazines of
national circulation 113 which tended to establish "that it was the custom
of the Georgia authorities to treat chain gang prisoners with persistent
and deliberate brutality . . [and] that Negro prisoners were treated
with a greater degree of brutality than white prisoners .... ,, 114 In
deciding that the alleged mistreatment had been established, the court was
influenced by the fact that the state of Georgia offered no testimony what-
soever in contradiction to that given by the appellant's witnesses."15 Iron-
ically, even this case so illustrative of the extraordinary circumstances
necessary to establish physical mistreatment was ultimately reversed on
other grounds.' 16 Moreover, since Johnson involved a prisoner who was
no longer in the hands of the authorities who had allegedly mistreated him,
it furnishes little hope for prisoners less favorably situated.
117
The problems involved in the vindication of the right to be free from
inhumane treatment are different, at least in degree, from those relating to
other prisoner rights. Although this right has long been recognized, re-
dress has been hampered by many of the difficulties which always face the
aggrieved prisoner but which are heightened in connection with mistreat-
ment. Not the least of these difficulties has been the reluctance of the
courts to enter this particularly complex area where the line between dis-
cipline and brutality may be shadowy indeed; an area where vengeance
and fear on all sides may seriously hinder the search for truth and the
implementation of any remedy. Perhaps the withering of the noninter-
113 These articles were considered proper for consideration because they had been
used by witnesses as a basis of comparison for conditions in Georgia prisons person-
ally known to them. Id. at 253.
114 Ibid.
115 Id. at 255-56.
116 338 U.S. 864 (1949) (per curiam).
117 Another way in which prisoners have sought to establish mistreatment which
might avoid the problems of the general run of such cases is by allegations of a
denial of necessary medical treatment. Although the denial of medical treatment
needed by a prisoner might at times be thought to rise to the level of cruel and
unusual punishment, such allegations have met with little success. See, e.g., Snow v.
Roche, 143 F.2d 718 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 788 (1944) ; Sarshik v. San-
ford, 142 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1944) (per curiam) ; Feyerchak v. Hiatt, 7 F.R.D. 726
(M.D. Pa. 1948); State ex rel. Baldwin v. Superintendent, 192 Md. 712, 63 A.2d
323 (1949) (per curiam); Commonwealth ex rel. Rogers v. Claudy, 170 Pa. Super.
639, 90 A.2d 382 (1952) (per curiam). In Coleman v. Johnston, 247 F.2d 273 (7th
Cir. 1957), petitioner brought suit under the Civil Rights Act alleging that while
unlawfully detained without charge he was denied desperately needed medical atten-
tion, and that this denial resulted in the necessity of having his leg amputated. The
district court dismissed the complaint on the theory that no deprivation of a consti-
tutional right had been alleged. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the
allegations were at least sufficient to prevent summary dismissal of the case. It is
not possible to be sure that the court had endorsed the view that in extreme cases there
may be a constitutional right to medical treatment. Only if this was in fact the
meaning of the court's decision, and if-extrapolating one step further-another court
would extend this right to a validly incarcerated prisoner, could Coleman represent
the beginning of a shift from the many cases which uniformly have refused relief where
denial of medical treatment had been alleged.
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ference doctrine with respect to other prisoner rights may encourage the
courts to a somewhat more sympathetic attitude and more vigorous action
in this area.
III. REMEDIES
A. Habeas Corpus ns
Habeas corpus has been the device most commonly employed by pris-
oners seeking relief from denials of constitutional rights." 9 However,
when a petitioner, admitting the validity of his imprisonment, attempts by
means of a habeas corpus petition to attack the manner in which he is
being held, he finds even greater difficulties than those normally associated
with this writ.120 In the overwhelming majority of cases the writ has
been refused unless the prisoner would be entitled to an absolute release.
These decisions are generally grounded on the judiciary's familiar re-
luctance to interfere with prison administration 2 1 or on an inherent
limitation of the writ itself.12 It is quite understandable that courts are
not anxious to interfere with prison administration when the time is not
yet ripe for action. For example, it is unnecessary for the court to ex-
amine the legality of part of a criminal sentence where relief is presently
unavailable since the prisoner is still serving the admittedly valid part of
his sentence.128 This argument, however, is not present where a condi-
11S Although habeas corpus is the most commonly used of the traditional remedies
in cases of alleged mistreatment of prisoners, several other common-law and equitable
remedies have been used-or their use sought-in this area. Among these are in-
junctions, see Piccoli v. Board of Trustees, 87 F. Supp. 672 (D.N.H. 1949); man-
damus, see Oregon ex rel. Sherwood v. Gladden, 240 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1957);
statutory remedies in the nature of mandamus, see Brown v. McGinnis, 10 N.Y.2d
531, 180 N.E.2d 791, 225 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1962) ; and common-law certiorari (which
has been used in New Jersey to permit review of parole board decisions), see Urbaniak,
Rights of Prisoners in Confinement, 8 CRImE & DELINQUENCY 121 (1962). Although
these remedies may on occasion permit the prisoner to avoid some of the problems
inherent in the use of habeas corpus, they are not of sufficiently general availability
to replace habeas corpus as the normal remedy in this area. Compare text accom-
panying notes 133-39 infra.
"19 See generally Note, 33 NEB. L. REv. 434 (1954); Note, 59 YALE L.J. 800
(1950); 2 J. PUB. L. 181-85 (1953).
1 2 0 An examination of the many problems involved in any habeas corpus pro-
ceeding is beyond the scope of this Note. See generally Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus:
Impact of An Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1315 (1961); Reitz,
Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy For State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L.
Rxv. 461 (1960). Rather this Note is concerned only with the peculiar problem
created by the fact that the prisoner admits that he is validly committed and objects
only to the manner of his confinement.
121 See, e.g., Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
822 (1952) ; Taylor v. United States, 179 F.2d 640, 643 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 988 (1950); Edmondson v. Warden, 194 Md. 707, 69 A.2d 919 (1949).
122 See, e.g., Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S.
131, 136-37 (1934); Commonwealth ex rel. Biglow v. Ashe, 348 Pa. 409, 35 A.2d
340 (1944); Commonwealth ex rel. Lieberman v. Burke, 158 Pa. Super. 207, 44
A.2d 597 (1945); United States ex rel. Westbrook v. Randolph, 259 F.2d 215, 220
(7th Cir. 1958) (dissenting opinion).
1= See McNally v. Hill, supra note 122, at 135; United States ex rel. Touhy v.
Ragen, 224 F.2d 611, 613 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956) ; Sturm
v. McGrath, 177 F.2d 472 (10 Cir. 1949).
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tional order 124 might be used to investigate the allegations, grant the
writ if proper, and remand the prisoner with directions for the correction
of the unconstitutional treatment of a prisoner. Nevertheless, the vast
majority of the courts have not recognized the possibility of a conditional
order and have refused to use the writ to grant relief in such situations,
assuming that habeas corpus may only be used where the remedy is
absolute release.125 Yet even under this view if the mistreatment is suffi-
ciently extreme the writ will be employed.1 26  In Johnson v. Dye,1' 7 the
petitioner, who had fled to Pennsylvania from a Georgia chain gang, was
initially successful in a federal habeas corpus proceeding thereby prevent-
ing his extradition. The court, deeply impressed by the inhumane treat-
ment that the petitioner had received, decided that a federal court was
obliged to set him free since Georgia had "failed signally in its duty as
one of the sovereign States of the United States to treat a convict with
decency and humanity." 128 Judge O'Connell, concurring, expressed seri-
ous doubts as to whether past infringement of Johnson's constitutional
rights would of itself entitle him to absolute release. However, recogniz-
ing that Johnson would face grave danger-and possible death-if ex-
tradited, he decided that it was preferable "that a potentially dangerous
individual be set free than the least degree of an impairment of an indi-
vidual's basic constitutional rights be permitted." '9
Not all courts feel themselves limited to the traditional view of habeas
corpus. In Coffin v. Reichard,' ° the court of appeals rejected this limita-
tion on the federal writ as serving no real purpose. The court expressed
the view that "any unlawful restraint of personal liberty may be inquired
into on habeas corpus. . . . This rule applies although a person is in
lawful custody. His conviction and incarceration deprive him only of such
liberties as the law has ordained he shall suffer for his transgressions." 131
The court then concluded that the remedy in a habeas corpus proceeding
is not limited to a simple remand or discharge but also may include a
remand with directions that a prisoner's rights be respected or an order
transferring the prisoner to another institution. Under this reasoning,
12 4 For an interesting solution by a court that believed that habeas corpus
should be used only for complete release, see Medley, Petitioner, 134 U.S. 160, 174
(1890). In this case the Court "absolutely released" a convicted murderer uncon-
stitutionally being detained in solitary confinement, but ordered that the attorney-
general of the state should be notified of the precise time of the release so that the
prisoner might promptly be rearrested.
12 See cases cited notes 121-22 supra.
126Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir.), rev'd per curiam on other grounds,
338 U.S. 864 (1949); Commonwealth ex rel. Thompson v. Day, 182 Pa. Super. 644,
648, 128 A.2d 133, 136 (1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 843 (1957) (dictum).
127 175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir.), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 338 U.S. 864
(1949).
128 Id. at 256.
129Id. at 257-58. The Supreme Court's reversal, 338 U.S. 864 (1949) (per
curiam) apparently rested on the grounds that exhaustion of state remedies, see Ex
parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1943), is also required where habeas corpus issued to
attack an extradition proceeding.
130 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
131 Id. at 445.
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habeas corpus becomes an adequate means for the review of alleged
deprivations of civil rights of prisoners. Nevertheless, only a small minor-
ity of courts 132 have reached the Coffin conclusion.
B. The Civil Rights Act
Absent a broad reading of habeas corpus, the most effective device
for remedying violations of rights of state prisoners appears to be pro-
vided by the federal Civil Rights Act, 13 3 which provides that any person
who under color of law or custom, deprives any person under the
jurisdiction of the United States of his constitutional or legal rights "shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress." 134 The act has been held applicable to
prisoners. 135 And it should not be difficult to show that prison authorities
acted under color of state authority; not only is the act applicable to the
enforcement of prison regulations, 36 but it may be applied to actions in
violation of state law which are carried out under "pretense of law." 137
Thus the greatest difficulty facing the prisoner who can establish the fact
of mistreatment is that of showing that a federal right has been violated.
For relief under this act-as under habeas corpus-requires the courts to
determine what rights a prisoner possesses, 38 a difficult task but one
which the courts have shown an increasing willingness to undertake.
39
M. W. S.
132 See United States ex rel. Westbrook v. Randolph, 259 F.2d 215 (7th Cir.
1958) ; In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1961) ; In re
Rider, 50 Cal. App. 797, 195 Pac. 965 (1920); People ex rel. Brown v. Johnston,
9 N.Y.2d 482, 215 N.Y.S.2d 44, 174 N.E.2d 725 (1961).
3




4 REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958). The statute is not ap-
plicable to federal law enforcement officials, Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581
(2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950); Swanson v. Willis, 114 F. Supp.
434 (D. Alaska 1953), aff'd per curiam, 220 F.2d 440 (9th Cir. 1955), but an action
in trespass will lie against such officials when they act outside the scope of their
authority, Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F.2d 135, 139-40 (D.C. Cir), cert. denied, 305
U.S. 643 (1938).
135 See Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196, 198 (4th Cir. 1961); Siegel v. Ragen,
88 F. Supp. 996, 998 (N.D. Ill. 1949), aff'd, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 990 (1950) ; Gordon v. Garrson, 77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Ill. 1948).
136 Siegel v. Ragen, supra note 135, at 998.
137 United States v. Jones, 207 F.2d 785, 786-87 (5th Cir. 1953).
138 See Siegel v. Ragen, 88 F. Supp. 996, 999 (N.D. Il1. 1949), af'd, 180 F.2d
785 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950).
139 For recent cases arising under this act, see Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233
(2d Cir. 1961) ; Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961) ; Bailleaux v. Holmes,
177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959), rev'd sub non. Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d, 632
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961). Manifestly not all "mistreatments"
by prison authorities will amount to a denial of a federal right. Compare Gordon v.
Garrson, 77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Ill. 1948), with Siegel v. Ragen, supra note 138.
In the past courts have been hesitant to grant injunctive relief because of the fear
that subsequent contempt proceedings might unduly hamper prison administration.
It has been suggested that the alternative relief of damages available under the act
would obviate this difficulty. See Note, 59 YALE L.J. 800, 808 (1950) ; 2 J. Pun. L.
181, 186 (1953).
